The Syufy Rosetta Stone by unknown
BYU Law Review
Volume 1992 | Issue 2 Article 13
5-1-1992
The Syufy Rosetta Stone
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
The Syufy Rosetta Stone, 1992 BYU L. Rev. 457 (1992).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1992/iss2/13
The Syufy Rosetta Stone 
Editors' Note: In 1990, United States v. Syufy Enterprises* 
grabbed headlines for its style as well as its legal substance. 
The reason: Some suspected that Judge Alex Kozinski of the 
Ninth Circuit worked more than 200 movie titles into the text of 
the opinion." Although Judge Kozinski will neither confirm 
nor deny the suspicions, a rogue citation to Leonard Maltin's TV 
Movies and Video Guide (see note 10) has set many movie buffs 
speculating. 
We tried our hand at it, and came up with 215 titles, 
underlined in the following reproduction of Judge Kozinski's 
opinion. Is it all just a big coincidence? 
CAUTION: Do not turn the page yet. Go ahead, make 
yourself a copy of the Syufy opinion from the Federal Reporter, 
get a copy of Maltin's book and see how well you do: 
0-50 movies: Get a life. 
50- 1 00: Law Geek-but there's hope. 
100-150: A modern centaur: half lawyer, half movie buff. 
150-200: Apply for a clerkship with Judge Kozinski now. 
200 plus: Forget the law and get into The Industry-you're a 
natural. 
OFFICIAL RULES: 
Movie titles are judged by the 1989 edition of Maltin's guide. 
Only feature films count; no made-for-TV movies or mini-series. 
Movie titles have to be exact; no letters may be added or deleted. 
Only permissible change: de-capitalization. 
Punctuation counts-"ir is not "it . ." and "help" is not "HELP!." 
Everything except the headnotes (which are not included since 
they are prepared by the printer) is fair game. 
Have fun! 
* 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990). 
** See, e.g., L. Gordon Crovitz, Verdict: Frantic Antitrust Ideas Are Gone with 
the Wind, WALL ST. J. May 23, 1990, at A23; Don DeBenedictis, Movie Movie, ABA 
J. August 1990, at 20; Appeals Court Blasts US. Monopoly Suit Vs. Syufy, 
V A R I ~ ,  May 10, 1990, at 1; Dick Goldberg, Judge Uses Ruling in Movie Case to 
Show What He Reel-ly Knows, L.A. DAILY J., May 10, 1990, at 1. 
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United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
Syufy Enterprises; Raymond J. Syufy, Defendants-Appellees 
NO. 89- 15475. 
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. 
903 F.2d 659. Argued and Submitted August 14, 1989. Decided 
May 9, 1990. 
Robert B. Nicholson, Department of Justice, Washington, 
D.C., for plaintiff-appellant. 
Maxwell M Blecher, Blecher & Collins, Los Angeles, 
California, for defendants-appellees. 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California. 
Before Wiggins and Kozinski, Circuit Judges, and 
Quackenbush, District Judge* 
Kozinski, Circuit Judge: 
Suspect that giant film distributors like Columbia, 
Paramount and Twentieth Century-Fox had fallen prey to 
Raymond Syufy, the canny operator of a chain of Las Vegas, 
Nevada, movie theatres, the United States Department of 
Justice brought this civil antitrust action to force Syufy to 
disgorge the theatres he had purchased in 1982-84 from his 
former competitors. The case is unusual in a number of 
respects: The Department of Justice concedes that moviegoers 
in  Las Vegas suffered no direct injury as a result of the 
allegedly illegal transactions; nor does the record reflect 
complaints from Syufy's bought-out competitors, as the sales 
were made a t  fair prices and not precipitated by any monkev 
business; and the supposedly oppressed movie companies have 
weighed in  on Syufy's side. The Justice Department 
nevertheless remains intent on rescuing this platoon of 
Goliaths from a single David. 
After extensive discovery and an & day trial, the learned 
district judge entered comprehensive findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, holding for Syufy. He found, inter alia, that 
Syufy's actions did not injure competition because there are no 
barriers to entry-others could and did enter the market-and 
that  Syufy therefore did not have the power to control prices or 
exclude the competition. While Justice raises a multitude of 
issues in its appeal, these key findings of the district court 
* The Honorable Justin L. Quackenbush, United States District Judge for the 
Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation. 
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present the greatest hurdle it must overcome. 
Gone are the days when a movie ticket cost a dime, 
popcorn a nickel and theatres had a single screen: This is the 
age of the multiplex. With more than 300 new films released 
every year-each potentially the next Batman or E.T.-many 
successful theatres today run a different film on each of their 
six, twelve or eighteen screens. The multiplex offers something 
for evewone: Moviegoers can choose from a wider selection of 
films; theatre operators are able to balance profits and losses 
from blockbusters and flops, and to reduce manpower by 
consolidating concession islands; the producers, of course, like 
having the extra screens on which to display their wares. 
Raymond Syufy understood the formula well. In 1981, he 
entered the Las Vegas market with a splash by opening a six- 
screen theatre. Newly constructed and luxuriously furnished, it 
put existing facilities to shame. Syufy's entry into the Las 
Vegas market caused a stir, precipitating a titanic bidding 
war.' Soon, theatres in Las Vegas were paying some of the 
highest license fees in the nation, while distributors sat back 
and watched the easy money roll in. 
It is the nature of free enterprise that fierce, no holds 
barred competition will drive out the least effective participants 
in the market, providing the most efficient allocation of 
productive resources. And so it was in the Las Vegas movie 
market in 1982. After a hard fought battle among several 
1. Film distributors do not hand prints for free; they sell exhibition 
licenses. These licenses normally spec* a percentage of weekly house receipts, 
known as license fees, payable by the theatre owner to the distributor. Where 
more than one theatre in a given area volunteers to pay the license fee for a 
particular film, the distributor has several options: It can license the film to more 
than one theatre in the area; it can award the film to a particular theatre with 
which i t  has an ongoing relationship; or it can let them all bid for exclusive 
exhibition rights. Where the distributor adopts the competitive bidding approach, as 
virtually all distributors did in Las Vegas prior to October 1984, the high bid 
usually includes a guarantee-a minimum fee payable to the distributor even if the 
film bombs. 
As bidding in Las Vegas grew more fierce, guarantee amounts went over the 
top. Too often, the bids were so high that theatre owners ran up substantial 
losses. The industry refers to these as busted guarantees, meaning that because 
the film did less business than was expected, the theatre was trapped into paying 
the higher guarantee amount instead of the percentage of box office it had 
negotiated. Occasionally, guarantees in Las Vegas were so high that they exceeded 
the gate at a particular theatre. 
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contenders, Syufy gained the upper hand. Two of his rivals, 
Mann Theatres and Plitt Theatres, saw their future as rocky 
and decided to sell out to Syufy. While Mann and Plitt are 
major exhibitors nationwide, neither had a large presence in  
Las Vegas. Mann operated two indoor theatres with a total of 
three screens; Plitt operated a single theatre with three 
screens. Things were relatively quiet until September 1984; in 
September, Syufy entered into earnest negotiations with 
Cragin Industries, his largest remaining ~ompetitor.~ Cragin 
sold out to Syufy midway through October, leaving Roberts 
Company, a small exhibitor of mostly second-run films, as 
Syufy's only competitor for first-run films in Las Vegas. 
I t  is these three transactions-Syufy's purchases of the 
Mann, Plitt and Cragin theatres-that the Justice Department 
claims amount to antitrust  violation^.^ As government counsel 
explained a t  oral argument, the thrust of its case is that "you 
may not get monopoly power by buying out your competitors." 
Tr. of Oral Arg. a t  1. 
Competition is the driving force behind our free enterprise 
system. Unlike centrally planned economies, where decisions 
about production and allocation are made by government 
bureaucrats who ostensibly see the big picture and know to & 
the  r i ~ h t  thing, capitalism relies on decentralized 
planning-millions of producers and consumers making 
hundreds of millions of individual decisions each year-to 
determine what and how much will be produced. Competition 
plays the key role in this process: It imposes an essential 
discipline on producers and sellers of goods to provide the 
consumer with a better product at a lower cost; it drives out 
inefficient and marginal producers, releasing resources to 
higher-valued uses; it  promotes diversity, giving consumers 
choices to fit a wide array of personal preferences; it avoids 
permanent concentrations of economic power, as even the 
2. Cragin's Redrock Theatre was an 11-screen multiplex. It was sold to Syufy 
when the enterprise fell upon hard times because of a dispute between partners 
Lucille Cragin and Horst Schmidt. 
3. Specifically, the government's complaint alleges monopolization and/or 
attempted monopolization of a part of commerce in violation of Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. $ 2 (1988), and substantial lessening of competition by 
acquisition within a line of commerce in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 
15 U.S.C. $ 18 (1988). 
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largest firm can lose market share to a feistier and hungrier 
rival. If, as the metaphor goes, a market economy is governed 
by an invisible hand, competition is surely the brass knuckles 
by which it enforces its decisions. 
When competition is impaired, producers may be able to 
reap monopoly profits, denying consumers many of the benefits 
of a free market. I t  is a simple but important truth, therefore, 
that our antitrust laws are designed to protect the integrity of 
the market system by assuring that competition reigns freely. 
While much has been said and written about the antitrust laws 
during the last century of their existence, ultimately the court 
must resolve a practical question in every monopolization case: 
Is this the type of situation where market forces are likely to 
cure the perceived problem within a reasonable period of time? 
Or, have barriers been erected to constrain the normal 
operation of the market, so that the problem is not likely to be 
self-correcting? In the latter situation, it might well be 
necessary for a court to correct the market imbalance; in the 
former, a court ought to exercise extreme caution because 
judicial intervention in a competitive situation can itself upset 
the balance of market forces, bringing about the very ills the 
antitrust laws were meant to prevent. See R. Coase, The Firm, 
The Market, and the Law 117-19 (1988); R. Posner, Economic 
Analysis of Law 324-25, 338-39 (3d ed. 1986). 
It is with these observations in mind that we turn to the 
case before us. Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of this case 
is that the accused monopolist is a relatively tiny regional 
entrepreneur while the alleged victims are humongous national 
corporations with considerable market power of their own. 
While this is not dispositive-it is conceivable that a little big 
man may be able to exercise monopoly power locally against 
-
large national entities-chances are it is not without 
significance. Common sense suggests, and experience teaches, 
that monopoly power is far more easily exercised by larger, 
economically more powerful entities against smaller, 
economi&lly punier ones, than vice versa. 
Also of significance is the government's concession that 
Syufy was only a monopsonist, not a mon~polist .~ Thus, the 
4. Monopsony is defined as a "market situation in which there is  a single 
buyer or a group of buyers making joint decisions. Monopsony and monopsony 
power are the equivalent on the buying side of monopoly and monopoly power on 
the selling side." R. Lipsey, P. Steiner & D. Purvis, Economics 976 (7th ed. 1984). 
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government argues that Syufy had market power, but that i t  
exercised this power only against its suppliers (film 
distributors), not against its consumers (moviegoers). This is 
consistent with the record, which demonstrates that Syufy 
always treated moviegoers fairly: The movie tickets, popcorn, 
nuts and the Seven-Ups cost about the same in Las Vegas as in 
-
other, comparable markets. While it is theoretically possible to 
have a middleman who is a monopolist upstream but not 
downstream, this is a somewhat counterintuitive scenario. 
Why, if he truly had significant market power, would Raymond 
Syufy have chosen to take advantage of the movie 
distributors while giving a fair shake to ordinary people? And 
why do the distributors, the alleged victims of the 
monopolization scheme, think that Raymond Syufy is the best 
thing that ever happened to the Las Vegas movie market? 
The answers to these questions are significant because, 
like all antitrust cases, this one must make economic sense. See 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 
574, 587, 594 n.19, 596-97, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 1360 n.19, 
1361-62, 89 L.Ed 2d 538 (1986). Keeping in mind that 
competition, not government intervention, is the touchstone of 
a healthy, vigorous economy, we proceed to examine whether 
the district court erred in concluding that Syufy does not, in 
fact, hold monopoly power. There is universal agreement that 
monopoly power is the power to exclude competition or control 
prices. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 
U.S. 377, 391, 76 S.Ct 994, 1004, 100 L.Ed. 1264 (1956); Syufy 
Enters. v. American Multicinema, Inc., 793 F.2d 990, 993 (9th 
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031, 107 S.Ct. 876, 93 L.Ed. 
2d 830 (1987). The district court determined that Syufy 
possessed neither power. As the government's case stands or 
falls with these propositions, the parties have devoted much of 
their analysis to these findings. So do we. 
I .  Power to Exclude Competition 
I t  is true, of course, that when Syufy acquired Mann's, 
Plitt's and Cragin's theatres he temporarily diminished the 
number of competitors in the Las Vegas first-run film market. 
But this does not necessarily indicate foul play; many legiti- 
mate market arrangements diminish the number of competi- 
tors. It would be odd if they did not, as the nature of competi- 
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tion is to make winners and 10sers.~ If there are no significant 
barriers to entry, however, eliminating competitors will not 
enable the survivors to reap a monopoly profit; any attempt to 
raise prices above the competitive level will lure into the mar- 
ket new competitors able and willing to offer their commercial 
goods or personal services for less. See Metro Mobile CTS, Inc. 
v. New Vector Cornnun., Inc., 892 F.2d 62, 63 (9th Cir. 1989). 
Time after time, we have recognized this basic fact of eco- 
nomic life: 
A high market share, though it may ordinarily raise an infer- 
ence of monopoly power, will not do so in a market with low 
entry barriers or other evidence of a defendant's inability to 
control prices or exclude competitors. 
Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Resources, Inc., 838 F.2d 360, 
366 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 180 102 
L.Ed.2d 149 (1988) (citation omitted). See also Hunt-Wesson 
Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 921 (1981) ("Blind reliance upon 
market share, divorced from commercial reality, [can] a 
misleading picture of a firm's actual ability to control prices or 
exclude c~mpetition.").~ There is nothing m a ~ c  about this 
proposition; it is simple common sense, embodied in the Anti- 
trust Division's own Merger Guidelines: 
If entry into a market is so easy that existing competitors 
5. See 3 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law 41 608e, a t  20-21 (1978); L. 
Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust 8 34, at 96 (1977). Given this reality, 
it would be perverse to expect rivals engaged in head on competition to act like 
best friends; indeed, it would be cause for suspicion if they did. 
6. We have previously held that a district court acts within the legitimate 
scope of its discretion in determining that evidence of a high market share estab- 
lishes a prima facie antitrust violation, shifting to the defendant the burden of 
rebutting the prima facie violation. See California u. American Stores Co., 872 F.2d 
837, 842 (9th Cir. 1989), reversed on other grounds, - U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 1853, 
LO9 L.Ed. 2d 240 (1990). The converse is not true, however; evidence of a high 
market share does not require a district court to conclude that there is an anti- 
trust violation. In fact, such a conclusion normally should not be drawn where the 
evidence also indicates that there is no barrier to entry into the relevant market. 
See Oahu Seru., Inc. u. Pacific Resources, Inc., 838 F.2d 360, 366 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870, 109 S.Ct. 180, 102 L.Ed.2d 149 (1988); accord American 
Stores, 872 F.2d at  842 ("An absence of entry barriers into a market constrains 
anticompetitive conduct, irrespective of the market's degree of concentration."). The 
explanation is simple; where entry barriers are low, market share does not accu- 
rately reflect the party's market power. United States u. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743 
F.2d 976, 982-83 (2d Cir. 1984). 
464 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992 
could not succeed in raising price for any significant period of 
time, the Department is unlikely to challenge mergers in that 
market. 
Antitrust Policies and Guidelines, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Merger 
Guidelines 5 3.3, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) qI 
13,103 a t  20,562 (1988). 
The district court, after taking testimony from a dozen and 
a half witnesses and examining innumerable graphs, charts, 
statistics and other exhibits, found that there were no barriers 
to entry in the Las Vegas movie market. Our function is nar- 
row: we must determine whether that finding is clearly errone- 
ous. See Oahu Gus, 838 F.2d a t  363, 367. Our review of the 
record discloses that the district court's finding is amply sup- 
ported by the record. 
We bypass as surplusage the hundreds of pages of expert 
and lay testimony that support the district court's finding, and 
focus instead only on a single-to our minds conclusive-item. 
Immediately after Syufy bought out the last of his three com- 
petitors in October 1984, he was riding high, having captured 
100% of the first-run film market in Las Vegas. But this u t o ~ i a  
proved to be only a mirage. That same month, a major movie 
distributor, Orion, stopped doing business with Syufy, sending 
all of its first-run films to Roberts Company, a dark horse com- 
petitor previously relegated to the second-run market.' Roberts 
Company took this as an invitation to step into the maior 
league and, against all odds, began giving Syufy serious compe- 
tition in the first-run market. Fighting fire with fire, Roberts 
opened three multiplexes within a 13-month period, each hav- 
ing six or more screens. By December 1986, Roberts was oper- 
ating 28 screens, trading places with Syufy, who had only 23. 
At the same time, Roberts was displaying a healthy portion of 
all fust-run films. In fact, Roberts got exclusive exhibition 
rights to many of its films, meaning that Sy&y could not show 
them a t  all. 
By the end of 1987, Roberts was showing a larger percent- 
age of first-run films than was the Redrock multiplex a t  the 
7. Second-run films are the same as first-run films, only older. When a film is 
initially released for public exhibition, it is in its first run. Once public demand for 
the film has fallen off (but usually before it is reduced to a dead calm), the fwst- 
run theatre will ship it out to make room for something more recent. The film 
may then open elsewhere in the same area, usually at a lower ticket price, this 
being the film's second run. 
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time Syufy bought it. Roberts then sold its theatres to United 
Artists, the largest theatre chain in the countw, and Syufy 
continued losing ground. It all boils down to this: Syufy's acqui- 
sitions did not short circuit the operation of the natural market 
forces; Las Vegas' first-run film market was more competitive 
when this case came to trial than before Syufy bought out 
Mann, Plitt and Cragin.' 
The Justice Department correctly points out that Syufy 
still has a large market share, but attributes far too much im- 
portance to this fact.' In evaluating monopoly power, it is not 
8. The government argues that the distrid court's finding that "Roberts was a 
successful competitor of Syufy in Las Vegas," United States v. Syufy Enters., 712 
F. Supp. 1386, 1393 (N.D.Ca1. 1989) (emphasis added), is clearly erroneous because 
i t  conflicts with a stipulation that "Roberts was not an effective competitor." United 
States v. Syufy Enters., No. C-86-3057-WHO at  6 (N.D.Ca1. Nov. 3, 1988) (Stipulat- 
ed Fads) (emphasis added). We see no reason to resolve this semantic squabble. 
The stipulation on which the government relies goes on to state that "Roberts 
expanded its operation in Las Vegas from five screens in 1983 to 28 screens in 
1987." Id. I t  is this fad  that colors our conclusion, not the particular adjective 
selected by the parties or by the district court. 
The stipulation-even if read as the government suggests-does not undermine 
the district court's separate findings that United Artists, Roberts' successor, "com- 
petes vigorously with Syufy, a substantially smaller chain," that UA is "much more 
successfil than was Roberts because of its substantial 'clout' with distributors," and 
that UA could, if it wished to, compete with Syufy even more vigorously. 712 
F.Supp. a t  1394. All of this amply supports the distrid court's determination that 
Syufy faces substantial competition. 
9. The government also challenges the district court's definition of the relevant 
upstream product market in Las Vegas. The court defined the market broadly to 
include not only first-run theatrical exhibition, but also "exhibition on home video, 
cable television, and pay-per-view television." 712 F.Supp. at 1389. We agree with 
the government that this is not the proper market definition in examining Syufy's 
power over film distributors. While moviegoers may well view these alternative 
methods of film exhibition as readily substitutable, film distributors do not. Distrib- 
utors use first-run theatrical exhibition to make sure that audiences are exposed to 
a film so that, even if it gets bad reviews and fails to turn a profit in theatres, 
people switch in^ channels or checking out videos will recognize the title and be 
induced by its fame to watch it. That first-run theatrical exhibition enhances a 
film's performance in auxiliary markets does not mean that auxiliary markets can 
substitute for theatrical release. The district court was therefore mistaken in 
relying on testimony that "of the 578 films produced in 1987, 214 were released on 
home video and not in the theatres," id. a t  1400, as there was no suggestion that 
any of these 214 films were suitable for theatrical release, or that any film has 
ever been released first on home video and then later played in first-run theaters. 
Jane Fonda's Low Impact Aerobic Workout may be a best-selling videocassette, but 
it is unlikely to be the hit a t  a local movie theatre. 
The district court's erroneous definition of the relevant upstream product 
market does not warrant reversal, however. The district court repeatedly made 
alternative findings using the government's narrower market definition limited 
solely to first-run exhibition. Our review of the record convinces us that these 
alternative findings are supported by substantial evidence. 
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market share that counts, but the ability t o  maintain market 
share. See Oahu Gas, 838 F.2d at 366. Syufy seems unable to 
do this. In 1985, Syufy managed to lock up exclusive exhibition 
rights to  91% of all the first-run films in Las Vegas. By the 
first quarter of 1988, that percentage had fallen to 39%; United 
Artists had exclusive rights to another %%, with the remain- 
ing 36% being played on both Syufy and UA screens. 
Syufy's share of box office receipts also dropped off, albeit 
less precipitously.2 In 1985, Syufy raked in 93% of the gross 
box office from first-run films in Las Vegas. By the first quarter 
of 1988, that figure had fallen to  75%. The government insists 
that 75% is still a large number, and we are hard pressed to 
disagree; but that's not the point. The antitrust laws do not 
require that rivals compete in a dead heat, only that neither is 
unfairly kept from doing his personal best. Accordingly, the 
government would do better to plot these points on a graph and 
observe the pattern they form than t o  focus narrowly on 
Syufy's market share at a particular time. The numbers reveal 
that RobertsNA has steadily been eating away at Syufy's mar- 
ket share: In two and a half years, Sydy's percentage of exclu- 
sive exhibition rights dropped 52% and its percentage of box 
office receipts dropped 18%. During the same period, 
10. The district court was entitled to rely on any of several indicia of Syufy's 
market share, including its percentage of first-run films, its percentage of first-run 
playdates and its percentage of gross box office receipts. As each of these indices 
points in the same direction-toward Syufy's decreasing market share-we fail to 
understand what the government hopes to gain by arguing that box office receipts 
are the only meaningful indicator of market share. 
In any event, we are unable to agree with the government on this issue. By 
focusing exclusively on box office receipts, the government attributes to Syufy a 
prescience he does not possess. No one, not even Syufy, can accurately predict how 
every movie will do at  the box office. As demonstrated by the large number of 
busted guarantees, exhibitors in Las Vegas often had great expectations for fdms 
that eventually disappeared without a trace. That does not necessarily mean that 
the films were bad or that the theatres that played them did not want them very 
much; i t  simply means that the exhibitor did not have perfect foresight. Thus, for 
example, the government stepped out of bounds in disparaging Powwow Highway. 
See Reply Brief for Appellant at 7-8 n. 7. While somewhat off beat, the film 
garnered terrific reviews and captured the Filmmakers Trophy a t  the Sundance 
United States Film Festival in Park City, Utah. LA Times, Jan. 31, 1989, a t  VI-7, 
col. 4. Film critic Sheila Benson described it as "a little zinger of a comedy with a 
rare backbone of intelligence"; "a pretty irresistible movie . . . that fixes [itself] 
permanently in our affections." LA Times, March 17, 1989, at  VI-1, col. 2, VI-16, 
col. 1. See also L. Maltin, Leonard Maltin's TV Movies & Video Guide 206 (1989). 
Reviews this good are not common; some theatre operators, seeing that a movie 
had become the critic's choice, might well be willing to go for the longshot rather 
than the sure thing. 
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RobertsKJA's newly opened theatres evolved from absolute be- 
ginners, barely staying alive, into a big business." 
The government concedes that there are no structural bar- 
riers to entry into the market: Syufy does not operate a bank or 
similar enterprise where entry is limited by government regu- 
lation or licensing requirements. Nor is this the type of indus- 
try, like heavy manufacturing or mining, which requires oner- 
ous front-end investments that might deter competition from 
all but the hardiest and most financially secure investors.12 
See R. Posner, supra p. 663, a t  290. Nor do we have here a 
business dependent on a scarce commodity, control over which 
might give the incumbent a substantial structural advantage. 
Nor is there a network of exclusive contracts or distribution 
arrangements designed to lock out potential competitors. To the 
contrary, the record discloses a rough-and-tumble industry, 
marked by easy market access, fluid relationships with distrib- 
utors, an ample and continuous supply of product, and a 
healthy and growing demand.13 It  would be difficult to design 
11. The Antitrust Division's Merger Guidelines adopt a two-year test in deter- 
mining whether there are barriers to entry in a market: if successful entry is 
likely within two years, there are no significant entry barriers, and the government 
will not challenge mergers in that market. Merger Guidelines $ 3.3, reprinted in 4 
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ql 13,103 at 20,562 (1988). Had the government applied the 
two-year test here, it surely would not have pursued this suit against Syufy. The 
critical acquisition occurred in October 1984; by December 1986, Roberts had not 
only successfidly entered the market, it was operating five more first-run screens 
than was Syufjr. 
12. The Justice Department argues that it is expensive to build a multiplex, 
but the district court was rightly unimpressed by this contention. Syufy was 
neither the first nor the last to open a multiplex in Las Vegas: Cragin's 11-screen 
Redrock was there before Syufy came into t h e  market and, sbon thereafter, Roberts 
opened three multiplexes in -quick succession. In fact, Roberts was spared the 
expense of construction, as several of its theatres were financed by shopping center 
developers from whom Roberts later leased space. See RT 2:254-55, 2:261, 2:272-73, 
2:278-79. 
13. The Justice Department claims that the district court misunderstood the 
evidence on this point. It argues that Las Vegas is "overscreened," i-e., that poten- 
tial competitors declined to enter the market because there was not enough busi- 
ness to go around. The district court made detailed contrary findings: The rule of 
thumb in the film industry is that it takes 10,000 people to support one screen. 
Las Vegas is populated by approximately 600,000 residents and 100,000 tourists a t  
any given time, leaving room for as many as 70 screens. Yet, at the time of trial, 
there were only 50 first-run screens in the city, meaning that the Las Vegas 
market offered ample opportunities to potential entrants. In addition, Las Vegas is 
a boom town, growing at the rate of 30,000 people a year. Thus, the potential for 
new entry into the first-run film market will continue. RT 2:300, 3:338, 6:989. 
"Because untapped potential provides a mouth-watering incentive for vigorous 
competition, it is axiomatic that monopoly power is unlikely to arise in dynamic 
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a market less susceptible to monopolization. 
Confronted with this record and the district court's clear 
findings, the government trots out a shopworn argument we 
had thought long abandoned: that efficient, aggressive competi- 
tion is itself a structural barrier to entry. According to the gov- 
ernment, competitors will be deterred from entering the market 
because they could not hope to turn a profit competing against 
Syufy. In the words of government counsel: 
There is no legal barrier. There is no law that says you can't 
come into this market, it's not that kind of barrier . . . . But, 
the fact of mere possibility in the literal sense, is not the 
appropriate test. Entry, after all, must, to be effective to dissi- 
pate the monopoly power that Syufy has, entry must hold 
some reasonable prospect of profitability for the entrant, or 
else the entrant will say, as  Mann Theatres said . . . this is 
not an attractive market to enter. There will be shelter. And 
the reason is very clear. You have to compete effectively in 
this market. And witness after witness testified you would 
need to build anywhere from 12 to 24 theatres, which is a 
very expensive and time consuming proposition. And, you 
would then find yourself in a bidding war against Syufy. 
Tr. of Oral Arg. a t  5 (emphasis added). 
The notion that the supplier of a good or service can mo- 
nopolize the market simply by being efficient reached high tide 
industries marked by a rapidly expanding volume of demand and low barriers to 
entry." Metro Mobile CTS, Inc. u. New Vector Commun., Inc., 892 F.2d 62, 63 (9th 
Cir. 1989). 
More fundamentally, the government's static model, which assumes that there 
is only so much demand for a particular product, is alien to modern economic 
theory, as  well as common sense, which teach us that things change. The demand 
for movie tickets can fluctuate with a variety of factors such as price, quality of 
the movie theatre, cost of related goods such as concession stand products, and 
quality of films shown. Even assuming that the Las Vegas movie market was, in 
some static sense, operating a t  capacity, the entry of a new competitor might, as 
the district court found, simply result in "the exit of some of the less attractive 
and less efficient theatres in Las Vegas." 712 F.Supp. a t  1396. Or, a new competi- 
tor with high hopes might price movie tickets lower, increase advertising, provide 
more convenient parking facilities, or otherwise induce people to go to the movies 
more often. Or, a theatre operator might hit the jackpot by catering to parents of 
small children who might be more likely to patronize drive-in theatres. We cannot 
and should not speculate as to the details of a potential competitor's performance; 
we need only determine whether there were barriers to the entry of new faces into 
the market. As we discuss in greater detail below, in making that determination 
we are not concerned with whether, once in the market, the competitor will wind 
up doing well. The thing to remember is that doing business in the crucible of free 
enterprise is inherently unpredictable. 
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in the law 44 years ago in Judge Learned Hand's opinion in 
United States u. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 
1945).14 In the intervening decades the wisdom of this notion 
has been questioned by just about everyone who has taken a 
close look a t  it. See, e.g., MCI Commun. Corp. u. AT&T, 708 
F.2d 1081, 1107-08 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891, 104 
S.Ct 234, 78 L.Ed 2d 226 (1983); 3 P. Areeda & D. Turner, 
supra n. 5, ¶ 608e, at 22 ("It is absurd to classify such behavior 
as unlawfully 'exclusionary."); L. Sullivan, supra n. 5, a t  103 
('The Hand formulation . . . fails to clearly identify the differ- 
ences between guilty and innocent conduct."). I t  has been 
soundly repudiated by the Second Circuit. See Berkey Photo, 
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263,273-74 (2d Cir. 1979), 
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093, 100 S.Ct. 1061, 62 L.Ed. 2d 783 
(1980). 
The argument government counsel presses here is a close 
variant of Alcoa: The government is not claiming that Syufy 
monopolized the market by being too efficient, but that Syufy's 
effectiveness as a competitor creates a structural barrier to 
entry, rendering illicit Syufy's acquisition of its competitors' 
screens. We hasten to sever this new branch that the govern- 
ment has caused to sprout from the moribund Alcoa trunk. 
I t  can't be said often enough that the antitrust laws protect 
competition, not competitors. As we noted earlier, competition 
is essential to the effective operation of the free market because 
it encourages efliciency, promotes consumer satisfaction and 
14. In Alcoa, Judge Hand concluded that defendant corporation violated the 
antitrust laws simply by making all the right moves, in particular, by filling the 
demand of which it was the creator: 
True, i t  stimulated demand and opened new uses for the metal, but not 
without making sure that i t  could supply what it had evoked . . . . 
"Alcoa" avows it as evidence of the skill, energy and initiative with which 
it has always conducted its business; as a reason why, having won its 
way by fair means, it should be commended, and not dismembered . . . . 
[We] may assume that all it claims for itself is true . . . . [But ilt was 
not inevitable that it should always anticipate increases in the demand 
for ingot and be prepared to supply them. Nothing compelled it to keep 
doubling and redoubling its capacity before others entered the field. I t  
insists that it never excluded competitors; but we can think of no more 
effective exclusion than progressively to embrace each new opportunity as 
it opened, and to face every newcomer with new capacity already geared 
into a great organization, having the advantage of experience, trade con- 
nections and the elite of personnel . . . . That was to "monopolize" that 
market, however innocently it otherwise proceeded. 
F.2d a t  430-32. 
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prevents the accumulation of monopoly profits. When a produc- 
er is shielded from competition, he is likely to provide lesser 
service a t  a higher price; the victim is the consumer who gets a 
raw deal. This is the evil the antitrust laws are meant to avert. 
But when a producer deters competitors by supplying a better 
product a t  a lower price, when he eschews monopoly profits, 
when he operates his business so as to meet consumer demand 
and increase consumer satisfaction, the goals of competition are 
served, even if no actual competitors see fit to enter the market 
a t  a particular time. While the successful competitor should not 
be raised above the law, neither should he be held down by 
law. 
-
The Supreme Court has accordingly distanced itself from 
the Alcoa legacy. taking care to distinguish unlawful monopoly 
power from "growth or development as a consequence of a supe- 
rior product, business acumen, or historic accident," United 
States u. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571, 86 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 
16 L.Ed. 2d 778 (1966), which is off limits to the enforcer of our 
antitrust laws. If a dominant supplier acts consistent with a 
competitive market-out of fear perhaps that potential competi- 
tors are ready and able to step in-the purpose of the antitrust 
laws is amply served. We make it clear today, if it was not 
before, that an efficient, vigorous, aggressive competitor is not 
the villain antitrust laws are aimed at eliminating. Fostering 
an environment where businesses fight it out using the weapon 
of efficiency and consumer goodwill is what the antitrust laws 
are meant to champion. As the Second Circuit has said: 'We 
fail to see how the existence of good will achieved through 
effective service is an  impediment to, rather than the natural 
result of, competition." United States u. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743 
F.2d 976, 984 (2d Cir. 1984). 
But we need not rely on theory alone in rejecting the 
government's argument. The record here conclusively demon- 
strates that neither acquiring the screens of his competitors 
nor working hard at better serving the public gave Syufy deliv- 
erance from competition. Immediately following the disappear- 
ance of M a n . ,  Plitt and Cragin, Roberts took up the challenge, 
-
aggressively competing with Syufy for first-run films-and with 
considerable success. United Artists, with substantial resources 
a t  its disposal and nationwide experience in running movie 
theatres, considered the market sufficiently open that it bought 
out Roberts in 1987. We see no indication that competition 
suffered in the Las Vegas movie market as a result of Syufy's 
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challenged acquisitions.15 The district court certainly had am- 
ple basis in the record for its finding that Syufy lacked the 
power to exclude competitors. Indeed, on this voluminous re- 
cord we are hard-pressed to see how the district court could 
have come to the other conclusion. 
2. Power to Control Prices 
The crux of the Justice Department's case is that Syufy, 
top gun in the Las Vegas movie market, had the power to push 
around Hollywood's biggest players, dictating to them what 
prices they could charge for their movies. The district court 
found otherwise. This finding too has substantial support in the 
record. 
Perhaps the most telling evidence of Syufy's inability to set 
prices came from movie distributors, Syufy's supposed victims. 
At the trial, distributors uniformly proclaimed their satisfaction 
with the way the Las Vegas first-run film market operates; 
none complained about the license fees paid by Syufy. 
Columbia's President of Domestic Distribution testified that 
"Syufy paid a fair amount of film rental" that compared favor: 
ably with other markets. RT 5:715. A representative of Buena 
Vista, a division of Disney, testified that Syufy had never re- 
fused to accept its standard terms. RT 6:924. Particularly dam- 
aging to the government's case was the testimony of the former 
head of distribution for MGMlUA that his company "never had 
any difficulty . . . in acquiring the terms that we thought were 
reasonable," RT 6:888, explaining that the license fees Syufy 
paid "were comparable or better than any place in the United 
States. And in most cases better." RT 6:911. Indeed, few if any 
15. The government points out that the interiors of United Artists' theatres 
were not as luxurious as those of Syufy. We have no what sinister inference 
the government would have us draw 'from this fact. As the district court noted, 
"No one stopped United Artists from remodeling Roberts7 theatres after it acquired 
them. As the largest exhibitor in the nation, it certainly has the resources to do 
so." 712 F.Supp. at 1402. Competitors need not provide a perfectly undifferentiated 
product in order to be competitive; it is a strength of our free market economy 
that competitors often provide products that cater to the varied tastes and prefer- 
ences of consumers. Syufy made a business decision to invest in luxury theatres 
while Roberts and United Artists apparently decided to dispose of their profits in 
some other fashion. I t  remains to be seen which strategy will ultimately prevail. 
Indeed, it is not a winner take all situation; in a free market, any number can 
play and any number can win. We therefore agree with the district court's refusal 
to conclude that this difference in business strategies was an indication of market 
failure. 
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of the distributors were willing to say anything to support the 
government's claim. 
The documentary evidence bears out this testimony. Syufy 
has at all times paid license fees far in excess of the national 
average, even higher than those paid by exhibitors in Los An- 
geles, the Mecca of Moviedom. In fact, Syufy paid a higher 
percentage of his gross receipts to distributors in 1987 and 
1988 than he did during the intensely competitive period just 
before he acquired Cragin's Redrock? 
While successful, Syufy is in no position to put the squeeze 
on distributors. The one time he tried there was an immediate 
backlash. In 1984, about seven days after allegedly acquiring 
its monopoly, Syufy informed Orion Releasing Group that he 
had cold feet about The Cotton Club and would not honor the 
large guarantees he had contracted for, only to see his gambit 
backfire. Orion sued Syufy for breach of contract, see Orion 
Pictures Distrib. Corp. v. Syufy Enters., 829 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 
1987), licensed the film to Roberts and cut Syufy off cold tur- 
key. To this day, Orion refuses to play its films in any Syufy 
theatre, in Las Vegas or elsewhere. 712 F.Supp. at 1393. Ac- 
cordingly, Syufy lost the opportunity to exhibit top moneymak- 
ers like Robocop, Platoon, Hannah and Her Sisters and No 
Way Out.'? The district court found no evidence that Orion 
considered RobertsLJA's theatres a less than adequate substi- 
tute for Syufy's. Id. 
Because he needs plenty of first-run films to fill his many 
screens (22 at the time of trial; 34 now), Syufy is vulnerable. 
Distributors like Orion have substantial leverage over Syufy. 
and they know it. One witness, the President of Domestic Dis- 
tribution for Columbia, testified at length about the power he 
and other distributors wield over Syufy: 
16. The government argues that the district court erred in finding this earlier 
level of competition to be "unhealthy." 712 F.Supp. at  1394. While we agree, we 
need not reverse because of the insignificance of the error. The erroneous finding 
was relevant to only one of three elements needed to prove the government's 
attempted monopolization claim. As the government was unable to demonstrate 
that Syufy had the power to control prices or to exclude competition, it cannot 
prevail even though we disregard the district court's finding of unhealthy competi- 
tion. 
17. The list of Orion films that played exclusively at Roberts theaters also 
includes such popular fare as Amadeus, Back to School, Bull Durham, Colors, 
Hoosiers, Married to the Mob, Radio Days and the unforgettable Throw Momma 
From the Train. 
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. . . [With] Sy&y having 23 first-run screens, he could not 
get into a two and a half percent fight with Columbia; he had 
so many mouths to feed in those theatres, that he was more 
or less compelled to pay national suggested terms for films. 
. . . .  
. . . He could have tried [to dictate terms], but he wouldn't 
have gotten away with it, your Honor. He was very vulnera- 
ble. My point is that he was very vulnerable in that market. 
He could not-he needed the flow of product to fill those 
screens, and to take on-to get into a fight with the distribu- 
tor over terms, or film rentals paid to a distributor, would 
create an attitude where we could sell [to] his opposition and 
he'd be egregiously hurt. 
. . a .  
. . . [He] was his own competition, your Honor. He had creat- 
ed such a large amount of screens that he was-he was 
himself-he was himself vulnerable. As I described before, if 
he would have pressed, and if he would have come to Jimmie 
Spitz and said, "I'm not going t6 pay you this percentage for 
the film," I would have said, "Fine, Ray, we'll stay out of the 
marketplace." He couldn't afford-he has to-he has to have 
film in his theatres. And that's the leverage that this compa- 
ny had with Mr. Syufy. 
RT 5:714-16 (testimony of James Spitz). 
After hours of such testimony, the judge quite rightly con- 
cluded that Syufy did not have the power to  control license 
fees. This evidence, moreover, reveals the trap in the oftmade 
assumption that, by virtue of being a leviathan, a company will 
automatically have the power to wield a big stick with which to 
push around suppliers, customers and competitors. While size 
no doubt provides significant business advantages, it can also 
have very substantial drawbacks, such as increased manage- 
ment costs and other diseconomies of scale.'' 
More fundamentally, in a free economy the market itself 
imposes a tough enough discipline on all market actors, large 
and small. Every supplier of goods and services is integrated 
into an endless chain of supply and demand relationships, 
making it dependent on the efficiency and goodwill of upstream 
18. See generally A. Alchian & W. Men, University Economics 270, 301 (1964); 
2 P. Areeda & D. 'l'urner, supra n. 5, 8 407b, at 286-87; R. Posner, supra p. 663, 
at 318 n. 2, 368. In business, as elsewhere in life, it is sometimes true that the 
bigger they are, the harder they fall. 
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suppliers, as well as the patronage of customers. Absent struc- 
tural constraints that keep competition from performing its 
levelling function, few businesses can dictate terms to  custom- 
ers or suppliers with impunity. It's risky business even to try. 
As Syufy learned in dealing with Orion and his other suppliers, 
a larger company often is more vulnerable to  a squeeze play 
than a smaller one. It is for that reason that neither size nor 
market share alone suffice to establish a monopoly. Without 
the power t o  exclude competition, large companies that try t o  
throw their weight around may find themselves sitting ducks 
for leaner, hungrier competitors. Or, as Syufy saw, the tactic 
may boomerang, causing big trouble with suppliers. 
On this record, we have no basis for overturning the dis- 
trict court's finding that Syufy lacked the power to set the 
prices he paid his suppliers. As with the district court's finding 
as to Syufy's power to  exclude competition, we believe the re- 
cord here lent itself to  only one sensible con~lusion.'~ 
3. Additional Considerations 
Undeterred by the district court's carefully crafted 45 page 
opinion, the government sets out a variety of other conten- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~  We have dealt with the principal ones during the 
course of our discussion and the rest are largely beside the 
point. By finding that Syufy did not possess the power to set 
19. The Justice Department throws out a volley of numbers which, it claims, 
show that Syufy managed to depress license fees after buying out his competitors. 
The government attributes the lower fees to the exercise of monopoly power, but it 
is mistaken. The percentage of box office receipts paid to movie distributors rises 
and falls due to a combination of factors; i t  is 'not an accurate measure of the 
competitiveness of the market. 
For example, in 1985, Syufy paid Universal a very low license fee (48.1%). The 
fact is, however, Syufy paid more money to Universal that year. than in any other 
from 1983 to 1988. The percentage only looks low because, in 1985, Universal 
released the hugely successful Back to the Future. The film played in Syufy's first- 
run theatres for more than six months; the longer a film's run, th; lower the 
percentage of gross receipts payable to the distributor. Thus, the low percentage 
rate was based on factors other than monopoly power, as the district court quite 
reasonably found. Support is missing in the record foi* the Justice Department's 
theory of a shakedown by a ruthless predator. 
20. Among them are the following: (1) the district court misdefined the relevant 
market; (2) the court did not understand that this was a monopsony case; (3) the 
court erred in looking beyond Syufy's large market share; (4) the court mistakenly 
looked a t  the number of first-run movies shown as indicative of market share; (5) 
the court was wrong to call the preacquisition level of competition "unhealthy"; (6) 
aggressive competition is itself a barrier to entry; (7) Las Vegas is "overscreened"; 
and (8) RobertdUnited Artists7 theatres are not as luxurious as Syufy's. 
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prices or to exclude competition, the district court removed the 
k i n g  pins from the government's litigation arsenal. Without 
these essential elements, it can make out a violation of neither 
the Sherman nor Clayton Acts; its lawsuit collapses like a 
house of ~ a r d s . ~ '  
I t  is a tribute to the state of competition in America that 
the Antitmst Division of the Department of Justice has found 
no worthier target than this paper tiger on which to expend 
limited taxpayer resources.22 Yet we cannot help but wonder 
whether bringing a lawsuit like this, and pursuing it doggedly 
through 27 months of pretrial proceedings, about two weeks of 
21. Absent any power to exclude competition, the goverment cannot prevail on 
its claim of monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, as that requires a 
showing that Syufy possesses monopoly power. Similarly, the attempted monopoli- 
zation claim fails because the government cannot show that there was a dangerous 
probability that Syufy would succeed in destroying competition. Finally, the lack of 
entry barriers prevents the government from prevailing on its Clayton Act claim, 
as Syufy's acquisition of its competitors was not likely to substantially lessen 
competition. 
In his concurrence, Judge Quackenbush complains that our focus on the lack of 
entry barriers is too narrow; he lists other factors that ought to be considered. 
Concurrence at  673. While we agree that these other factors are relevant, as 
explained in the preceding paragraph, the total lack of entry barriers in Las Vegas 
determines the outcome of these factors in this case: Because others easily could 
(and did) enter the market successfully, Syufy lacked "the ability to maintain 
[market] share, the power to control prices, [and] the capability of excluding 
competitors." Id. 
Judge Quackenbush suggests that, under our holding, no one having "less than 
100 percent of market share" could ever have a monopoly "since the existence of 
competitors in the market would apparently establish the lack of barriers to entry." 
Concurrence at 674. We respectfully disagree. Entry barriers pertain not to those 
already in the market, but to those who would enter but are prevented from doing 
so. See Merger Guidelines $ 3.3, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg.Rep. (CCH) ql 13,103 a t  
20,562 (1988) (focusing on difficulty of "entry into a market"). Thus, a market 
containing two firms, each having a 50% share, could well be deemed monopolistic 
if entry barriers prevented other firms from gaining a foothold. 
22. The concurrence disputes our benign characterization of Syufy, relying 
largely on his conduct in another market. Concurrence a t  674. As a general mat- 
ter, we do not agree with this logic. Antitrust violations must be judged on a 
market-by-market basis. That Syufy may have been guilty of some impropriety in 
the past would not justify the government's decision to  pursue a drawn-out legal 
battle as to his conduct in Las Vegas unless there was substantial evidence of 
wrongdoing in Las Vegas. 
In any event, Syufy Enters. u. American Multicinema, Inc., 793 F.2d 990 (9th 
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031, 107 S.Ct. 876, 93 L.Ed. 2d 830 (1987), on 
which Judge Quackenbush relies, does not support his point; rather, i t  supports 
ours. In American Multicinema, we reversed an antitrust jury verdict against Syufy 
for insufficient evidence. See 793 F.2d at  1001-03. Given the infrequency with 
which we reverse jury verdicts, the Antitrust Division might have considered this, 
if a t  all, as a sign that Syufy was not the evildoer he was made out to be. 
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trial and now the full distance on appeal, really serves the 
interests of free competition. 
The record here demonstrates in graphic detail that Syufy's 
entry into the Las Vegas first-run movie market resulted in a 
vast improvement for movie distributors and consumers alike. 
By all accounts, Raymond Syufy's theatres are among the finest 
built and best run in the nation, making him somewhat of a 
local hero. At the same time, movie distributors have nothing 
but praise for Syufy, as his being there has invigorated theatre 
attendance in Las Vegas, substantially driving up their reve- 
nues. As is often the case when a vigorous competitor enters 
the market, more complacent theatre operators were eliminat- 
ed, but there was no credible evidence that Syufy did anything 
improper to drive them out. 712 F.Supp. a t  1390-91. Indeed, by 
buying them out, Syufy may well have helped cushion the loss- 
es they would have suffered had they been required to sell the 
theatres a t  fire sale prices or leave them abandoned. 
What then was the problem the government sought to 
solve by bringing this lawsuit? At oral argument, the lawyer for 
the government explained it thus: 
[Basically] if you drive down by anti-competitive conduct the 
price at which theatre owners buy film licenses, then there 
will be less [films] ultimately produced, because there will be 
a distortion in the natural market in the competitive forces, 
and people who go to movies like you and me would ultimate- 
ly have less choice. 
Tr. of Oral Arg. a t  9. It is, we suppose, not out of the question 
that what Raymond Syufy and other local theatre operators do 
in their respective markets could stem the avalanche of movies 
that comes to us out of Hollywood every year. Yet movie dis- 
tributors are not exactly a powerless lot, likely to surrender h 
first time they are presented with hard choices by a theatre 
operator; nor are they reluctant to precipitate a showdown 
when they believe their rights are being infringed.23 And, as 
we have seen, the market has its own failsafe mechanisms. 
Where the government inserts an antitrust enforcement action 
23. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., 
866 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1989), Orion Pictures Distrib. Corp. v. Syufy Enters., 829 
F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1987); ltventieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 
1327 (9th Cir. 1983), Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Thompson Theatres, Inc., 621 
F.2d 1088 (10th Cir. 1980). 
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into this type of situation, there is a real danger of stifling 
competition and creativity in the marketplace. 
It is well known that some of the most insuperable barriers 
in the meat race of competition are the result of government 
regulation. Regulation often helps entrench existing businesses 
by placing new entrants at a competitive disadvantage. It is 
perhaps less well appreciated that litigation itself can be a 
form of regulation; lawsuits brought by the government impose 
significant costs on enterprises that are sued, and create signif- 
icant disincentives for those that are not. 
In this case, the government was suspicious because Syufy 
bought out the movie theatres of his retreating competitors. 
But, in a competitive market, buying out competitors is not 
merely permissible, it contributes to market stability and pro- 
motes the efficient allocation of resources. The fact is, a relent- 
less, growing competitor is frequently the most logical buyer of 
a business that is declining. For competitors in a free market to 
fear buying each other out lest they be hit with the expense 
and misery of an antitrust enforcement action amounts to a 
burden only slightly less palpable than a direct governmental 
prohibition against such a pur~hase.'~ In a free enterprise sys- 
tem decisions such as these should be made by market actors 
responding to market forces, not by government bureaucrats 
pursuing their notions of how the market should operate. Per- 
sonal initiative, not government control, is the fountainhead of 
progress in a capitalist economy. 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
24. We are aware, of course, that even in a monopoly situation competitors 
may buy each other out where the selling company is failing. See United States v. 
General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 507, 94 S.Ct. 1186, 39 L.Ed. 2d 530 (1974); 
F. & M. Schaefer Corp. u. C. Schmdt & Sons, Inc., 597 F.2d 814, 817-18 (2d Cir. 
1979). But establishing a failing company defense is not easy; a competitor must 
be in critical condition to be subject to acquisition under that doctrine. In a com- 
petitive market, however, there is no need to rely on a failing company defense, 
and the ability to buy out competitors who are merely ailing may well promote 
market efficiency, enhance consumer welfare and foster competition. 
